The Chinese Communist government claims it has a right to "ownership" of Tibet. It does not claim this right on the basis of its military conquest in 1949, or its alleged effective control over Tibet since then, or since 1959. The Chinese Government also does not base its claim to "ownership" on the so-called "Seventeen-Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet" which it forced upon Tibet in 1951.
China's alleged legal claim is based on historical relationships - primarily of Mongol or Manchu rulers of China with Tibetan lamas and, to a lesser extent, of Chinese rulers and Tibetan lamas. The main events relied on by the Chinese Government occurred centuries ago: during the height of Mongol imperial expansion, when the Mongol emperors extended their political supremacy throughout most of Asia and large parts of Eastern Europe; and when Manchu emperors ruled China and expanded their influence throughout East and Central Asia, including Tibet, particularly in the eighteenth century.
It is not disputed that at different times in its long history Tibet came under various degrees of foreign influence: that of the Mongols, the Gorkhas of Nepal, the Manchu emperors of China and the British rulers of India. At other times in Tibet's history, it was Tibet which exercised power and influence on its neighbours, including China. It would be hard to find any state in the world today that has not been subjected to foreign domination or influence at some era in its history. In Tibet's case the degree and length of foreign influence and interference was quite limited. Moreover, the relationship with Mongol, Chinese and Manchu rulers, to the extent they had political significance, was personal in nature and did not at any time imply a union or integration of the Tibetan state with, or into, a Chinese state.
However fascinating Tibet's ancient history may be, its status at the time of the Chinese invasion must, of course, be judged on the basis of its position in modern history, especially its relationship with China since 1911 when the Chinese overthrew foreign Manchu rule and became the masters of their own country. Every country can go back to some period in history to justify territorial claims on neighbouring states. That is unacceptable in international law and practice.
The reader of China's White Paper, Tibet -- Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation, will be struck by the scant attention its authors pay to Tibet's modern history in the decades before 1949. This is because, from 1911 to the completion of the Chinese occupation in 1951, there is no evidence of Chinese authority or influence in Tibet to support China's claim. In fact, the preponderance of evidence shows precisely the opposite: that Tibet was to all intents and purposes a sovereign state, independent of China. This conclusion is supported by most legal scholars and experts on the subject.
The International Commission of Jurists' Legal Enquiry Committee on Tibet reported in its study on Tibet's legal status: "Tibet demonstrated from 1913 to 1950 the conditions of statehood as generally accepted under international law. In 1950 there was a people and a territory, and a government which functioned in that territory, conducting its own domestic affairs free from any outside authority. From 1913-1950 foreign relations of Tibet were conducted exclusively by the Government of Tibet, and countries with whom Tibet had foreign relations are shown by official documents to have treated Tibet in practice as an independent State." [Tibet and Chinese People's Republic, Geneva, 1960, p. 5,6.]
Forty years of independence is clearly sufficient time for a country to be regarded as such by the international community. Many members of the United Nations today have enjoyed a similar, or even shorter, period of independence. But in Tibet's case, even its ancient history has been selectively re-written by the Chinese Government's propaganda machine to serve the purpose of defending its claim to "ownership". Thus, even if it is not necessary to discuss Tibet's early history in order to understand its status on the eve of China's military invasion, we believe it is useful to review it briefly, just to set the record straight.
The status of Tibet: 1911-1951
There can be little argument that on the eve of China's military invasion, which started at the close of 1949, Tibet possessed all the attributes of independent statehood recognized under international law: a defined territory, a population inhabiting that territory, a government, and the ability to enter into international relations.
The territory of Tibet largely corresponds to the geological plateau of Tibet, which consists of 2.5 million square kilometres. At different times in history wars were fought and treaties signed concerning the precise location of boundaries.
The population of Tibet at the time of the Chinese invasion was approximately six million. That population constituted the Tibetan people, a distinct people with a long history, rich culture and spiritual tradition. Tibetans are a people distinct from the Chinese and other neighbouring peoples. Not only have the Tibetans never considered themselves to be Chinese, the Chinese have also not regarded the Tibetans to be Chinese (hence, for example, the references to "barbarians" in Chinese historical annals).
The government of Tibet was headquartered in Lhasa, the capital city of Tibet. It consisted of a Head of State (the Dalai Lama), a Cabinet of Ministers (the Kashag), a National Assembly (the Tsongdu), and an extensive bureaucracy to administer the vast territory of Tibet. The judicial system was based on that developed by Emperor Songtsen Gampo (seventh century), Lama Changchub Gyaltsen (fourteenth century), the Fifth Dalai Lama (seventeenth century) and the Thirteenth Dalai Lama (twentieth century), and was administered by magistrates appointed by the Government.
The Government of Tibet levied taxes, minted its own currency, ran the country's postal system and issued postage stamps, commanded Tibet's small army, and generally conducted all affairs of government. It was an ancient form of government which had served the needs of Tibet well in the past, but was in need of reform for the country to keep pace with the great political, social and economic changes that were taking place in the world. The Tibetan form of government was highly de-centralized, with many districts and principalities of Tibet enjoying a large degree of self-government. This was, to a large extent, inevitable due to the vastness of the territory and the lack of modern communication systems.
The international relations of Tibet were focused on the country's neighbours. Tibet maintained diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with countries in the region such as Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Mongolia, China, British India, and, to a limited extent, with Russia and Japan.
Tibet's independent foreign policy is perhaps most obviously demonstrated by the country's neutrality during World War II. Despite strong pressure from Britain, the U.S.A. and China to allow the passage of military supplies through Tibet to China when Japan blocked the strategically vital "Burma Road", Tibet held fast to its declared neutrality. The Allies were constrained to respect this.
China today claims that "no country ever recognized Tibet". In international law, recognition can be obtained by an explicit act of recognition or by implicit acts or behaviour. The conclusion of treaties, even the conduct of negotiations, and certainly the maintenance of diplomatic relations are forms of recognition. Mongolia and Tibet concluded a formal treaty of recognition in 1913; Nepal not only concluded peace treaties with Tibet and maintained an Ambassador in Lhasa, but also formally stated to the United Nations in 1949, as part of its application for UN membership, that it maintained independent diplomatic relations with Tibet as it did with several other countries including the United Kingdom, the United States, India and Burma.
Nepal, Bhutan, Britain, China and India maintained diplomatic missions in Tibet's capital, Lhasa. Although China claims in its propaganda that its mission in Tibet was a branch office of the so-called Commission of Tibetan and Mongolian Affairs of the Guomindang Government, the Tibetan Government only recognized this as a diplomatic mission. Its status was no higher than the Nepalese Embassy (Nepal had a full Ambassador or "Vakil" in Lhasa) or the British Mission.
The Tibetan Foreign Office also conducted limited relations with the United States when President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent emissaries to Lhasa to request assistance for the Allied war effort against Japan during the Second World War. Also, during the four UN General Assembly debates on Tibet in 1959, 1960, 1961 and 1965, many countries expressly referred to Tibet as an independent country illegally occupied by China.
Relations with Nationalist China
China's position was ambiguous during this period (1911-49). On the one hand, the Nationalist Government unilaterally announced in its constitution and in communications to other countries that Tibet was a province of the Republic of China (one of the "five races" of the Republic). On the other hand, it recognized that Tibet was not part of the Republic of China in its official communications with the Government of Tibet. Thus, China's President repeatedly sent letters and envoys to the Dalai Lama and to the Tibetan Government asking that Tibet "join" the Republic of China. Similar messages were sent by China to the Government of Nepal. Both Tibet and Nepal consistently refused to join China.
In response to the first letter of Chinese President Yuan Shikai, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama rejected the invitation to join the Republic, explaining courteously but firmly that Tibetans did "not approve" of the Chinese Government due to past injustices and stated:
"The Republic has only just been proclaimed and the national foundations are far from strong. It behooves the President to exert his energies towards the maintenance of order. As for Thibet, the Thibetans are quite capable of preserving their existence intact and there is no occasion for the President to worry himself at this distance or to be discomposed."[Guomin Gongbao, January 6, 1913]
In China's White Paper, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama is quoted as having told the "envoy" sent by "Beijing" in 1919 that, "It is not my true intention to be on intimate terms with the British... I swear to be loyal to our country and jointly work for the happiness of the five races."
In that year an unofficial, Chinese delegation went to Lhasa, ostensibly to present religious offerings to the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, but in reality to urge the Tibetan leader to negotiate an agreement with China. However, the Dalai Lama rejected the overture outright and, instead, called for tripartite negotiations in Lhasa.
Liu Manqing, a woman of mixed Tibetan and Chinese parentage, did arrive in Lhasa in 1930. But her visit was described as personal. However, during a purportedly personal visit, she tried to approach the Tibetan Government with communications from the Chinese President, but the Tibetans gave her no encouragement.
In China's White Paper, it is stated that the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, in his communications through her, expressed his belief that Tibet is a part of China. The Dalai Lama is quoted as having said, "My greatest wish is for the real peace and unification of China", etc. There is no historical record of the Dalai Lama having made such a statement in 1930. On the contrary, the official record of the Dalai Lama's reply to the Chinese President in 1930 contradicts this statement. The record refers to a list of eight questions submitted to the Dalai Lama on behalf of the Chinese President and contains each of the Dalai Lama's responses.
On relations with China and Chinese influence in Tibet, the Dalai Lama said: "For the stability of Tibet's religio-political order and the happiness of its subjects, it may be better to hold negotiations and conclude treaties as this will result in dependable arrangements."
On Tibet's independence and the border territories Tibet wanted returned from China, the Dalai Lama said: "Under the priest-patron relationship that prevailed so far, Tibet has enjoyed wide independence. We wish to preserve this. We feel that there will be long-term stability if the territories we have lost to outsiders are returned to us."[Record of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama's communication, dated 15th day of the 4th Tibetan Month, Iron Horse Year, 1930].
Other Chinese envoys to Tibet, such as General Huang Musung (1934), and Wu Zhongxin (1940), were also told in no uncertain terms by the Tibetan Government that Tibet was, and wished to remain, independent. It may be stated here that neither the Chinese Government, nor its "special envoy" (Huang Musung), had any role, as claimed in the White Paper, in the appointment of Reting Rinpoche as the regent after the death of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama in 1933.
Huang Musung was the first Chinese to be permitted to enter Tibet in an official capacity since 1911. The Tibetans did not refuse him permission, because he purportedly came to offer religious tribute and condolences for the late Dalai Lama, an act for which Tibetans hardly refused permission to anyone.
Huang Musung arrived in Lhasa in April 1934, three months after Reting Rinpoche became Regent. The Tsongdu (National Assembly) had nominated three candidates for the regency; Reting Rinpoche, Gaden Tripa Yeshi Wangdhen and Phurchok Rinpoche. Out of them, Reting Rinpoche was selected through a dough-ball rotating ceremony conducted in front of the statue of Avalokitesvara in the Potala. [Thupten Tenthar Lawutara in Bhod ki Lo-rGyud Rig-gNes dPyed gShe rGyu-cha bDams BsGrigs, Vol. 12, People's Publishing House, Beijing, 1990]
In the White Paper, China claims that Tibetan Government officials were sent to participate in China's National Assembly sessions in 1931 and 1946 in Nanjing.
In fact, in 1931, Khenpo Kunchok Jungne was appointed by the Dalai Lama to set up a temporary liaison office in Nanjing, China, and maintain contact with the Chinese Government. Likewise, in 1946 a Tibetan mission was sent to Delhi and Nanjing to congratulate Britain, the United States and China on the Allied victory in the Second World War. They had no instruction or authority to attend the Chinese National Assembly. Speaking about this to the International Commission of Jurists' Legal Inquiry Committee on August 29, 1959, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama said, "They (Tibetan delegates in Nanjing) had no official part in the Assembly. When the propaganda came to the knowledge of our Government they were instructed by telegram not to attend."
As for the establishment of the Commission for Tibetan and Mongolian Affairs by the Nationalist Guomindang Government, that too served only to bolster a myth; to this day, the Guomindang Government in Taiwan maintains this Commission which, it claims, not only has jurisdiction over Tibet, but also over the whole of Mongolia, including Outer Mongolia, whose independence has been internationally recognized since 1924. In fact, this Commission was not recognized by the Tibetan Government and never had any authority with respect to Tibet.
United Nations Debates
When Chinese Communist armies started entering Tibet in 1949, the Tibetan Government sent an urgent appeal to the United Nations to help Tibet resist the aggression. The General Assembly was advised by Britain and India not to take any action for the time being in order not to provoke a full-scale attack by China. But, to most countries, China's attack on Tibet was aggression.
This became especially evident during the full debates on the issue in the United Nations General Assembly in 1959, 1960, 1961 and 1965, when many governments echoed the sentiments expressed by the Ambassador of the Philippines who referred to Tibet as an "independent nation" and added: "(I)t is clear that on the eve of the Chinese invasion in 1950, Tibet was not under the rule of any foreign country." He described China's occupation as "the worst type of imperialism, and colonialism past or present." The Nicaraguan representative condemned the Chinese invasion of Tibet and said: "The people of America, born in freedom, must obviously be repelled by an act of aggression ... and particularly when it is perpetrated by a large state against a small and weak one." The representative from Thailand reminded the Assembly that the majority of states "refute the contention that Tibet is part of China." Similarly the Government of the United States condemned and denounced Chinese "aggression" and their "invasion" of Tibet.
Irish Representative Frank Aiken stated: "For thousands of years, or for a couple of thousand years at any rate, (Tibet) was as free and as fully in control of its own affairs as any nation in this Assembly, and a thousand times more free to look after its own affairs than many of the nations here." [UN GA Docs A/PV 898 1960; A/PV 1394, 1401 1965]
In fact, during those debates, it was only the Communist bloc which openly sided with China on the issue. From the official statements made during those debates, it is clear that China's assertion that no country ever recognized Tibet's independence, or considered their military intervention to be aggression, is simply not true.
Conclusion
The Chinese Government cannot deny the fact that Tibet was independent between 1911 and 1951 without distorting history. Even China's last Head of Mission in Lhasa, Shen Tsung-Lien, wrote after leaving the country in 1948 that "since 1911 Lhasa (i.e. the Tibetan Government in Lhasa) has to all practical purposes enjoyed full independence". [Tibet and the Tibetans, Shen, T. and Liu, S., New York, 1973, p.62] Mao Zedong himself, when he passed through the border regions of Tibet during the Long March, and was given food and shelter by local Tibetans, remarked: "This is our only foreign debt, and some day we must pay the Mantzu (sic) and the Tibetans for the provisions we were obliged to take from them." [Red Star over China, Edgar Snow, New York, 1961, p.214. Emphasis added, ed.]
The origin and position of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama
China's White Paper states, "In 1653 and 1713, the Qing emperors granted honorific titles to the Fifth Dalai Lama and the Fifth Bainqen (Panchen) Lama, henceforth establishing the titles of the Dalai Lama and the Bainqen Erdini and their political and religious status in Tibet. The Dalai Lama ruled the bulk of areas from Lhasa while the Bainqen Erdini ruled the remaining area of Tibet from Xigatse (Shigatse)." This claim is absolutely baseless.
The Tibetan religious scholar and sage Tsongkhapa (1357-1419) founded the Gelug school of Tibetan Buddhism. It became the fourth major school of Tibetan Buddhism, the others being the Nyingma, the Sakya and the Kagyu. Panchen Gedun Drup was Tsongkhapa's principal disciple.
Panchen Gedun Drup's third incarnation, Sonam Gyatso, was invited to the Mongol Court of Altan Khan who first conferred the title of "Talai (Dalai) Lama" on him. The title was applied retrospectively to his two previous incarnations, making him the Third Dalai Lama. Thus began the line of the Dalai Lamas. It is thus not true, as Chinese propaganda claims, that the title "Dalai Lama" was first established by a Manchu emperor a century later.
The relationship established by the Third Dalai Lama with Altan Khan was a spiritual one, but it would have political repercussions two centuries later, in 1642, when the Mongol prince, Gushri Khan, helped the Fifth Dalai Lama (1617-1682) to become the supreme political and spiritual ruler of Tibet. The Fifth Dalai Lama, in his turn, conferred the title of "Choekyi Gyalpo" (Dharma Raja) to his Mongol patron. From that time on, successive Dalai Lamas ruled Tibet as sovereign heads of state. The political position of the Dalai Lamas was, therefore, not established by a Manchu emperor of the Qing Dynasty, as claimed in the White Paper, but by the Fifth Dalai Lama with the help of his Mongol patron, two years before the Qing Dynasty was even established.
Tashilhunpo Monastery was established in 1447 by Panchen Gedun Drup, retrospectively known as the First Dalai Lama. Successive abbots of Tashilhunpo monastery were given the title "Panchen" because of their scholarship. The Fifth Dalai Lama gave his teacher, Panchen Lobsang Chokyi Gyaltsen (1570-1662), the ownership of Tashilhunpo monastery and some additional estates. After that, the Panchen Lamas were selected on the basis of reincarnation, each successive Panchen Lama retaining ownership of the monastery and estates. This situation was common among many incarnate lamas, such as the Sakya, Phagpa-la, Dakyab Loden Sherab, etc., who had been given estates by the Tibetan Government. But this had absolutely no political significance.
Contrary to Chinese Communist propaganda, the Panchen Lamas and other high lamas exercised religious authority only and were not involved in the political administration of any part of Tibet. In fact, the political authority of Shigatse and Tashilhunpo lay with the district governor appointed by Lhasa.
Thus, the Manchu emperor played no role in the establishment of the religious or political status of the Dalai Lama, and none with respect to the Panchen Lama's position either.
After the invasion of Tibet the Chinese Communist government consistently tried to use the late Panchen Lama to legitimize its position in Tibet. Beijing appointed him to political positions and urged him to denounce, and take the place of, the Dalai Lama on a number of occasions. But the Panchen Lama refused to do so, and suffered many years of imprisonment and maltreatment as a result.
The Chinese Government claims in the White Paper, as did past Guomindang governments, that it played a decisive role, through its envoy Wu Zhongxin, in the selection and installation of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama in 1940 and states that "the simple reality that the installation of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama needed the approval of the (Chinese) national government is sufficient proof that Tibet did not possess any independent power during that period (1911-1949]."
In reality, the Dalai Lama was selected according to the age-old religious beliefs and traditions of the Tibetans and no approval of the Chinese Government was needed or sought. It was in 1939, one year prior to Wu's arrival in Lhasa, that Regent Reting announced the name of the present Dalai Lama to the Tibetan National Assembly. This unanimously confirmed the candidate.
When the enthronment ceremony took place on February 22, 1940, Wu, like envoys from Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal and British India, had no special role. Sir Basil Gould, the British Political Officer who represented British India, explains that the official Chinese version of events was a fiction which had been prepared and published before the enthronement. That fictitious account by Wu Zhongxin, which China today relies on, reflected what the Chinese had intended to happen, but what did not in fact occur.
Chinese propaganda has also used a Chinese news report featuring a photograph of the Dalai Lama with Wu Zhongxin, captioned as having been taken during the enthronement ceremony. But according to Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, this photo was taken a few days after the ceremony, when Wu had a private audience with the Dalai Lama.
"Wu Zhongxin's claim of having presided over the enthronement ceremony on the basis of this photograph is a blatant distortion of historical facts," Ngabo said in Tibet Daily on August 31, 1989.
Early history
According to Tibetan annals, the first king of Tibet ruled from 127 BC, but it was only in the seventh century AD that Tibet emerged as a unified state and a mighty empire under Emperor Songtsen Gampo. With his rule, an era of political and military supremacy and territorial expansion started that lasted for three centuries. The King of Nepal and the Emperor of China offered their daughters to the Tibetan Emperor in marriage.
The marriages with the Nepalese and Chinese princesses were of particular importance, because they played vital roles in the spread of Buddhism in Tibet. Chinese propaganda always refers to political implications of Songtsen Gampo's wedding to the Chinese imperial princess Wen Cheng, conveniently ignoring the Tibetan ruler's other consorts, particularly his Nepalese bride, whose influence was, if anything, greater than that of her Chinese counterpart.
Tibetan Emperor Trisong Detsen (reign: 755-797) expanded the Tibetan empire by conquering parts of China. In 763 China's capital Chang'an (modern day Xian) was invaded and China had to pay an annual tribu?te to Tibet. In 783 a treaty was concluded which laid down the borders between Tibet and China. A pillar inscription at the foot of the Potala Palace in Lhasa bears witness to some of these conquests.
The peace treaty, concluded between Tibet and China in 821, is of particular importance in illustrating the nature of relations between these two great powers of Asia. The text of this treaty, both in Tibetan and Chinese, was inscribed on three stone pillars: one was erected in Gungu Meru to demarcate the borders between the two nations, the second in Lhasa where it still stands, and the third in the Chinese capital of Chang'an. Passages quoted from the pillars in the White Paper are inaccurate and out of context, and aimed at creating the impression that some sort of "union" resulted from the treaty. Nothing is further from the truth, as is clear from the following principal passage of that treaty: "Tibet and China shall abide by the frontiers of which they are now in occupation. All to the east is the coun?try of great China; and all to the west is, without ques?tion, the country of great Tibet. Henceforth, on neither side shall there be waging of war nor seizing of terri?tory."
It is hard to see how China can, in its White Paper, interpret these events as showing that "the Tibetans and Hans (Chinese) had, through marriage between royal families and meetings leading to alliances, cemented political and kinship ties of unity and political friendship, and formed close economic and cultural relations, laying a solid foundation for the ultimate founding of a unified nation." In fact, the historical records, both Tibetan and Chinese, contradict such an interpretation and refer to separate and powerful empires.
In the mid-ninth century the Tibetan state fragmented into several principalities. Tibetan attention focused on India and Nepal from where a strong religious and cultural influence brought about a major spiritual and intellectual renaissance.
Relations with the Mongol Emperors (1240-1350)
The Mongol ruler Genghis Khan and his successors conquered vast territories in Asia and Europe creating one of the largest empires the world has ever known, stretching from the Pacific to eastern Europe. In 1207 the Tangut empire north of Tibet fell to the advancing Mongols and, in 1271, the Mongols announced the establishment of the Mongol Yuan Dynasty to rule the eastern part of the empire. By 1279 the Chinese Sung dynasty in southern China fell before the advancing armies and the Mongols completed their conquest of China. Today, China claims the Yuan Dynasty to be its own dynasty and, by doing so, it lays claim to all Mongol conquests, at least in the eastern half of the Mongol Empire.
Prince Goden, grandson of Genghis Khan, dis?patched an expedition to Tibet in 1240 and invited one of Tibet's leading religious hierarchs, Sakya Pandita Kunga Gyaltsen (1182-1251), to his court, thus establishing an enduring Tibetan-Mongol relationship. Here began the unique ch?-y?n (priest-patron) relationship. Kublai Khan, who succeeded Goden Khan, embraced Tibetan Buddhism and adopted Drogon Choegyal Phagpa, nephew of Sakya Pandita, as his spiritual mentor.
This ch?-y?n relationship resulted in Kublai adopting Buddhism as his empire's state religion, and Phagpa became its highest spiritual authority. In gratitude, Kublai Khan offered his Tibetan lama political authority over all Tibet in 1254, conferring various titles on him.
These early ch?-y?n relationships were followed by many similar relationships between Mongol princes and Tibetan noble families and Tibetan lamas. This unique Central Asian relationship also formed the basis of later relations between Manchu emperors and successive Dalai Lamas. The ch?-y?n relationship itself was purely a personal one arising from the religious devotion of the patron for the priest and continued to exist even if the political status of the patron changed. This was evident in the Mongol-Tibetan relationship, which continued to exist even after the fall of the Yuan Dynasty.
An essential element of the ch?-y?n relationship was the protection that the patron provided his lama in return, not for the latter's allegiance, but for his religious teachings and blessings. Some ch?-y?n relationships acquired important political dimensions and the patron was expected to provide military support to protect the lama and his teaching or ?church'. Superiority of the protector was not implied, as Chinese propaganda suggests, since the lay patron was the student and worshipper of his lama.
When Buddhism became the state religion in the eastern part of the Mongol empire and the Sakya Lama (Phagpa) its highest spiritual authority, the Mongol-Tibetan relationship could be best described in terms of mutual interdependence. This concept provided for dual political and religious paramountcy of the worldly emperor and the spiritual leader on the basis of equality and interdependence. While the spiritual leader depended on the emperor for protection and for backing in ruling Tibet, the conquering emperor depended on the lama to provide the legitimacy for his rule of the Mongol Empire.
It is undeniable that Mongol emperors spread their influence over Tibet. But, contrary to the assertion made in the Chinese White Paper that, "In the mid-thirteenth century Tibet was officially incorporated into the territory of China's Yuan Dynasty", none of the Mongol rulers ever made any attempt to administer Tibet directly: Tibet did not even pay taxes to the Mongol empire, and it certainly was never considered part of China by the Mongol emperors.
Tibet broke its political relationship with the Mongols in 1350 when the Tibetan king, Changchub Gyaltsen (reign: 1350-1364), replaced the Sakya lamas as the most powerful ruler of Tibet. Changchub Gyaltsen did away with Mongol influences in the Tibetan administrative system and introduced a new and distinctly Tibetan one. He also enacted a Code of Law (Trimyig Shelchey Chonga, 15-Article Code), for the administration of justice in the kingdom. The Chinese regained their independence from Mongol rule and established the Ming Dynasty eighteen years after that.
Relations with Chinese Emperors (1368-1644)
The White Paper claims that the Chinese Ming Dynasty "replaced the Yuan Dynasty in China and inherited the right to rule Tibet". But there is no historical basis for this assertion. As shown above, the relationship between Mongol khans or emperors and Tibetan lamas predated the Mongol conquest of China. Similarly, Tibet broke with the Mongol emperors before China regained its independence from them. The Chinese Ming emperors inherited no relationship from the Mongols. On the other hand, Mongol Khans continued to maintain their intensive religious and cultural ties with Tibetans, often in the form of ch?-y?n relationship, for centuries afterwards.
Even if the Mongols did exercise influence in Tibet, it is still too presumptuous on the part of China to claim inheritance of Tibet through erstwhile Mongol rulers of China when an independent Outer Mongolia today exists as the only legitimate representative of the Mongolian people and nation.
Contacts between Tibet and Ming China were spasmodic and largely limited to visits by individual lamas of various, sometimes rival, monasteries to China, and the granting of honorific imperial titles or gifts by the Chinese Emperor to them. These visits are recorded in Tibetan histories of the fifteenth to seventeenth century, but there is no evidence whatsoever of political subordination of Tibet or its rulers to China or the Ming Emperors. In its White Paper, the Chinese Government alleges that these contacts with individual lamas demonstrate Ming authority in and over Tibet. But since Tibet was not ruled by any of those lamas, whatever the nature of their contacts with China, they could not affect the independent status of Tibet.
From 1350 Tibet was ruled by the princes of Phagmodru and then, from about 1481, by the Rimpung dynasty. In 1406 the ruling Phagmodru prince, Dakpa Gyaltsen, turned down the imperial invitation to him to visit China. This clearly shows the sovereign authority of Tibetan rulers at that time. From about 1565 until the rise to power of the Fifth Dalai Lama in 1642 (two years before the fall of the Ming Dynasty), the kings of Tsang ruled Tibet. There are indications of sporadic diplomatic relations between some of these rulers and Ming emperors, but the latter exercised neither authority nor influence over them.
In 1644 the Chinese emperors were once again over?thrown by foreign conquerors. The Manchus succee?ded in esta?blishing their own imperial dynasty, which ruled over a large empire, the most important part of which was China. They called it the Qing Dynasty.
Relations with the Manchus (1639-1911)
In 1642 the Great Fifth Dalai Lama, with the help of his Mongol patron Gushri Khan, became the supreme political and religious ruler of unified Tibet. Since then, Tibetans regarded him as their "Gongsa Chenpo" or "The Supreme Sovereign". His prestige was recognized far beyond Tibet's borders. The Fifth Dalai Lama not only maintained a close relationship with the Mongols but also developed intimate ties with the Manchu rulers.
In 1639, before the Dalai Lama acquired supreme political power and also before the Manchu conquest of China and the establishment of the Qing Dynasty, Manchu Emperor Tai Tsung invited the Dalai Lama to his capital, Mukden (present-day Shenyang). Unable to accept the invitation personally, the Dalai Lama sent his envoy who was treated with great respect by the emperor. Thus the ch?-y?n relationship between the Dalai Lama and the Manchu rulers was established.
As was true of the Tibetan relationship with the Mongol emperors, the links developed between Tibetans and the Manchu emperors did not involve China. As Owen Lattimore points out in reference to the Qing Dynasty, "what existed in fact was a Manchu Empire, of which China formed only one part." [Studies in Frontier History].
Having conquered China and annexed it to the Manchu empire, Emperor Shunzi invited the Fifth Dalai Lama in 1653 for a state visit to the imperial capital. In an unprecedented sign of respect, the Manchu emperor made a four-day journey outside his capital (Peking) to receive the Tibetan sovereign and foremost spiritual leader of Central Asian Buddhists. Commenting on the Dalai Lama's visit, W.W. Rockhill, an American scholar and diplomat in China, wrote: "(The Dalai Lama) had been treated with all the ceremony which could have been accorded to any independent sovereign, and nothing can be found in Chinese works to indicate that he was looked upon in any other light; at this period of China's relations with Tibet, the temporal power of the Lama, backed by the arms of Gusri Khan and the devotion of all Mongolia, was not a thing for the Emperor of China to question." [The Dalai Lamas of Lhasa and Their Relations With Emperors of China, 1644-1908, T'oung Pao 11, 1910, p.37]
On this occasion the Fifth Dalai Lama and the Manchu emperor bestowed unprecedented high complimentary titles upon each other and the ch?-y?n relationship was reaffirmed. In the White Paper, the Chinese Government refers only to the honorific title given by the Emperor to the Dalai Lama, but conveniently omits any mention of the similar honorific title granted by the Dalai Lama to the Emperor. Chinese propaganda infers that it was this deed by the Manchu Emperor which conferred the legal right to the Dalai Lama to rule Tibet. This interpretation intentionally misses the point of the event, namely that titles were exchanged by two sovereign leaders. If the Dalai Lama was dependent on his imperial title for the exercise of his authority, then so was the Manchu Emperor dependent on the title granted by the Dalai Lama for the exercise of his authority.
Throughout the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) relations between Tibet and the Manchu Emperors remained formally based on the ch?-y?n relationship. The Manchu Emperor readily responded to the appeals for help to drive out invading Dzungar Mongols and escort the newly-discovered Seventh Dalai Lama to the Tibetan capital in 1720.
Manchu forces entered Tibet on three more occasions in the eighteenth century, once to protect Tibet against invading Gorkha forces from Nepal (1792), and twice to restore order after civil wars (1728 and 1751). Each time they came at the request of the Tibetans, and each time the ch?-y?n relationship was invoked.
The Manchus did succeed in establishing some degree of influence in Tibet during those crisis periods. But their influence declined rapidly afterwards, rendering them unable to play any role when Tibet fought wars against invaders from Jammu (1841-1842), Nepal (1855-1856), and British India (1903-1904). By the mid-nineteenth century the Manchu emperor's role (and the related role of the amban) was only nominal.
The White Paper devotes considerable attention to Emperor Qianlong's so-called twenty-nine-article edict, or regulations, of 1793 concerning Tibet, and to the appointment of ambans (ambassadors). It presents the "regulations" as if they were an imperial order proving extensive Manchu authority in Tibet. In reality, the twenty-nine points were suggestions made by the emperor for certain reforms of the Government of Tibet following its war with Nepal. The ambans were not viceroys or administrators, but were essentially ambassadors appointed to look after Manchu interests, and to protect the Dalai Lama on behalf of the emperor.
In 1792 the Gorkhas of Nepal invaded Tibet following a dispute between Tibet and Nepal and the Dalai Lama appealed to the Manchu emperor for help. The emperor sent a large army which helped Tibet drive out the Gorkhas, and mediated a treaty of peace between Tibet and Nepal. Since this was the fourth time the emperor was asked to send troops to fight for the Tibetan Government, he wanted some say in Tibetan affairs in order to prevent Tibetans from becoming involved in conflicts which might again precipitate requests for the Manchu Court's military involvement.
The "regulations" were suggestions made in the context of the emperor's protector role, rather than an order from a ruler to his subjects. This emerges clearly from the statement made by the imperial envoy and commander of the Manchu army, General Fu K'ang-an, to the Eighth Dalai Lama, which goes thus:
"The Emperor issued detailed instructions to me, the Great General, to discuss all the points, one by one, in great length. This demonstrates the Emperor's concern that Tibetans come to no harm and that their welfare be ensured in perpetuity. There is no doubt that the Dalai Lama, acknowledging his gratitude to the Emperor, will accept these suggestions once all the points are discussed and agreed upon. However, if the Tibetans insist on clinging to their age-old habits, the Emperor will withdraw the Ambans and the garrison after the troops are pulled out. Moreover, if similar incidents occur in the future, the Emperor will have nothing to do with them. The Tibetans may, therefore, decide for themselves as to what is in their favour and what is not or what is heavy and what is light, and make a choice on their own." [Quoted from Ya Han Chang's Biography of the Dalai Lama in Bhod ki Lo rGyus Rags Rims gYu Yi Phrengba, Vol 2, Published by Tibet Institute of Social Science, Lhasa, 1991, p.316].
Rather than accepting or rejecting the Emperor's suggestion, Tibetans adopted some of the twenty-nine points which were perceived to be beneficial to them, and disregarded those they thought to be unsuitable. As Panchen Choekyi Nyima, the predecessor of the Late Panchen Lama, said: "Where Chinese policy was in accordance with their own views, the Tibetans were ready to accept the amban's advice; but ... if this advice ran counter in any respect to their national prejudices, the Chinese Emperor himself would be powerless to influence them." [Diary of Capt. O'Connor, September 4, 1903].
Among the important suggestions of this "twenty-nine-point edict" was the emperor's proposal for the selection of great incarnate lamas, including the Dalai Lamas and Panchen Lamas, by drawing lots from a golden urn. This important task, however, remained the responsibility of the Tibetan Government and high lamas, who continued to select reincarnations according to religious traditions. Thus - even on the first occasion when the golden urn should have been employed for the selection of the Ninth Dalai Lama in 1808 - Tibetans disregarded it.
Another important point of this "edict" was the role of ambans. The amban's role resembled that of an ambassador, at times, and that of a resident in a classical protectorate relationship, at other times. It is best defined in the explanation Amban Yu Tai gave in 1903 to Mortimer Durand, the Foreign Secretary of the Government of India (as reported by him), "he was only a guest in Lhasa - not a master - and he could not put aside the real masters, and as such he had no force to speak of." [Sir Mortimer Durand: A Biography, by Sir Percy Sykes, London 1926, p.166].
Similarly, two Lazarist missionaries, Huc and Gabet, who were in Lhasa in the mid-nineteenth century, described the position of the ambans as follows: "the Government of Tibet resembles that of the Pope and the position occupied by the Chinese Ambass?adors was the same as that of the Austrian Ambassador at Rome." [Decouverte du Thibet, 1845-1846, M. Huc, 1933, p.50]. The reference to "Chinese Ambassadors" is a common misnomer, because the Manchu Emperors were careful to appoint not Chinese ambans but Manchus or Mongolians, a fact which stressed that the appointment of the amban was an extension of the protector's role in the ch?-y?n relationship, a relationship from which the Chinese were excluded.
The unprecedented invasion of Tibet by Manchu troops in 1908 was a turning point in relations between Tibet and the Manchu emperor. Previous imperial military expeditions had come to assist the Dalai Lama or the Tibetan Government at their invitation. But this time, the Manchu emperor attempted to establish his authority in Tibet by force, largely to remove increasing British influence in Tibet. In 1910 the Dalai Lama fled to neighbouring India, but the occupation of Tibet was short-lived. When the Manchu Emperor tried to "depose" the Dalai Lama in 1910, the Dalai Lama declared the termination of the ch?-y?n relationship. The protector had attacked his lama and, thereby, violated the very foundation of their relationship.
Resistance to the invasion succeeded when the Manchu Empire collapsed in 1912 and Tibetans forced the occupation army to surrender. That summer Nepalese mediation between Tibet and China resulted in the conclusion of the "Three Point Agreement" providing for formal surrender and the expulsion of all remaining imperial troops. After returning to Lhasa, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama issued a proclamation reaffirming the independence of Tibet on February 14, 1913.
Relations with British India (1857-1911)
Since the end of the eighteenth century, Britain developed a keen interest in establishing trade with Tibet. Since all the Himalayan states which were closely linked to Lhasa had gradually been tied to British India by means of treaties and other agreements, Tibet feared it would also lose its independence if it did not resist British efforts to gain access to Tibet.
The Thirteenth Dalai Lama steered Tibet on an independent course. This policy frustrated the British who feared, more than anything, that a Russian infiltration into Tibet would tip the balance of power in Central Asia. Unable to communicate effectively with Tibet, Britain approached the Manchu court for assistance in forcing Tibet to cooperate. The result was the conclusion, without Tibet's participation or knowledge, of two treaties (1890 and 1893) between Britain and China which had provisions regarding Tibet. The Tibetan Government rejected these treaties as ultra vires, and this precipitated the British invasion of Tibet in 1903. The Manchu emperor did not then come to the assistance of Tibet and, as noted by Amban Yu Tai, disclaimed any responsibility for the action of the Tibetans. British troops left Lhasa within a year, after concluding a bilateral treaty, the Lhasa Convention, with the Tibetan Government.
The provisions of the Lhasa Convention necessarily pre-supposed the unrestricted sovereignty of Tibet in internal and external matters, otherwise Tibet could not legitimately have transferred to Britain the powers specified in the treaty. The Lhasa Convention did not even acknowledge the existence of any special relationship between the Manchu Emperor and Tibet. The very act of concluding this Convention constituted an implicit recognition by Britain of Tibet as a state competent to conclude treaties on its own behalf without having to consult any external power.
In an effort to persuade China to cooperate, Britain convinced it to sign the Adhesion Agreement in 1906, once again, without the participation and knowledge of Tibet. That agreement and the 1907 agreement concluded between Britain and Russia, confirmed the existence of a sphere of British influence in Tibet and introduced the concept of Chinese "suzerainty" over Tibet - something neither Tibet nor the Manchu court accepted.
In 1908, during Tibet's brief invasion by the Manchu army, Britain again signed a treaty concerning trade with Tibet with the Manchus, with no independent Tibetan participation.
Referring to the British concept of suzerainty, Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, explained: "Chinese suzerainty over Tibet is a constitutional fiction - a political affectation which has only been maintained because of its convenience to both parties. ... As a matter of fact, the two Chinese (i.e. Manchu) Ambans at Lhasa are there not as Viceroys, but as Ambassadors." [Papers CD 1920, No.66, GoI to IO, January 8, 1903. India Office Library].
Relations with India
When India became independent in 1947, it took over the British diplomatic Mission in Lhasa, and inherited the treaty relations of Britain with Tibet. Its recognition of Tibet was clear from the official communication the Indian Government sent to the Tibetan Foreign Office: "The Government of India would be glad to have an assurance that it is the intention of the Tibetan Government to continue relations on the existing basis until new arrangements are reached on matters that either party may wish to take up. This is the procedure adopted by all other countries with which India has inherited treaty relations from His Majesty's Government." [Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed by the Governments of India and China, Vol 2, 1959, p.39]
Self-determination
China's White Paper speaks about its alleged "ownership" of Tibet; it discusses broad issues relating to human rights, including social, economic and cultural rights, but does not address the fundamental question of the right of the Tibetan people to self-determination.
Under international law, populations which meet the criteria of "a people", possess the right to self-determination. Governments may not deny that right, and must act in accordance with it. In past decades, the right to self-determination has primarily been applied to colonial countries and peoples, but, particularly in recent years, the right is applied outside the context of decolonization also.
The Tibetan people clearly constitute a people under international law, as defined, among others, by the UNESCO International Meeting of Experts on Further Study of the Concept of the Rights of Peoples.
It is difficult to conceive of a better example of a distinct people, with all the characteristics fulfilled: commonalities in history, language, culture, ethnicity and other manifestations of shared identity and experience; numerousness, i.e., enough persons sharing common identity and experience to warrant recognition by the international community; the existence of institutions to give expression and effect to these commonalities; the will of a people to assert the right to self-determination.
The right to self-determination means the right of a people to "determine their own political status and to determine their economic, social and cultural development" free from outside interference. [International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 1; and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art. 1;] Tibetans have been denied the exercise of this right since their country's invasion and occupation by China. Under international law, the PRC has the obligation to permit its exercise.
The implementation of the right to self-determination can lead to integration with a state, association with a state or to independence, but the choice must be made by the people exercising their right to self-determination. This choice must be made freely, without any interference from outside that people. Thus, it is for the Tibetan people alone, without interference from China, to make the choice.
The Dalai Lama has, for many years, called on China to agree to the holding of an internationally-supervised plebiscite to determine the wishes of the Tibetan people. This is the most desirable approach, entirely in accordance with the requirements of international law and practice.
Recognition of Tibet's right to self-determination
In 1961 the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted Resolution 1723 (XVI), in which it explicitly recognized the right of the Tibetan people to self-determination. The UN called on the PRC to cease "practices which deprive the Tibetan people of their fundamental human rights and freedoms, including their right to self-determination". Four years later, in 1965, the UNGA expressly reaffirmed this resolution in UNGA Res. 2079 (XX).
Earlier, in 1959, the first prime minister of independent India, Jawaharlal Nehru, expressed his strong support for the Tibetan people's right to self-determination. Addressing the Lok Sabha, the Lower House of the Indian Parliament, he said, "the last voice in regard to Tibet should be the voice of the people of Tibet and nobody else".
Recently, on two separate occasions, experts on the question of rights of peoples and international law met to consider the question of Tibet's claim to self-determination.
The Permanent Tribunal of Peoples, which met in Strasbourg for a week to hear extensive testimony and arguments in November 1992, found that the Tibetans meet the generally accepted legal criteria of "a people" with the right to self-determination and "are therefore entitled to exercise the right to self-determination". The Tribunal concluded that "the presence of the Chinese administration on Tibetan territory must be considered as foreign domination of the Tibetan people". Finally, in its verdict, the Tribunal decided that, "the Tibetan people have from 1950 been, continuously, deprived of their right to self-determination." [Session on Tibet, Verdict, Permanent Tribunal of Peoples, Strasbourg, November 20, 1992, p.15 and 23, resp.].
In an unrelated conference, several weeks later, thirty eminent international lawyers from many countries in Europe, Africa, Asia and the Americas - among them some of the world's foremost authorities on self-determination - met in London for four days to consider issues relating to the exercise of the right to self-determination by the Tibetan people. After extensive consideration of evidence, including the Chinese Government's White Paper, and after a lively legal debate, the conference participants concluded, in a written statement, that,
Under international law the Tibetan people are entitled to the right to self-determination, that this right "belongs to the Tibetan people" and that "(i)t is not for the state apparatus of the PRC, or any other nation or state, to deny the Tibetan people's right to self-determination".
"Since the military action of 1949-50, Tibet has been under the alien occupation and domination of the PRC and has been administered with the characteristics of an oppressive colonial administration."
"In the particular case of Tibet and having regard to its long history of separate existence", the Tibetan people's claim to self-determination, including independence, is compatible with the principles of national unity and territorial integrity of states. [International Lawyers' Conference Statement on Tibet - London 1993, London, January 10, 1993, p.6-8].
The international conference statement called on the United Nations and members of the international community to take urgent measures to promote an early implementation and realization of the Tibetan people's right to self-determination.
- In both discussions, that of the Peoples' Tribunal and that of the International Lawyers' Conference, the points of view of the Chinese Government, in particular as expressed in its White Paper, were discussed at length and fully considered.
- The Chinese Government was invited to participate in both events, but declined to do so. It did, however, submit to the meetings for consideration the White Paper and numerous other publications stating its point of view and arguments.
Conclusion
